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ZELMAN v. SIMMONS-HARRIS, 536 U.s. 639 
(2002), argued 20 Feb. 2002, decided 27 June 2002 
by vote of 5 to 4; Rehnquist for the Court, O'Connor 
and Thomas concurring, Souter, Stevens, and 
Breyer i.n dissent. As part of a plan to improve 
educa tional opportunities in Cleveland, the state 
of Ohio enacted legislation providing tuition aid 
to low-income parents. These parents, ra ther than 
send their children to the usual public school, 
could make use of a state-subsidized voucher 
to send their children to participating public or 
private schools. In the 1999-2000 school year, 
no suburban public school participated in the 
program; instead, 82 percent of the participating 
schools were religious and 96 percent of the 
students participating in the program attended 
these religiously affiliated schools. 
In 1999 and 2000, a federal district judge in 
the Northern District of Ohio and a divided 
panel of the Sixth U.s. Circuit Court of Appeals 
concluded that the Ohio law had the primary effect 
of advanCing religion and therefore violated the 
*Establishment Clause of the "First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court overturned this finding, 
contending that previous decisions have drawn 
a "consistent distinction between government 
programs that provide aid directly to religious 
schools, and programs of true private choice, in 
which government aid reaches religious schools 
only as a result of the genuine and independent 
choice of private individuals" (p. 649). It did not 
matter that nea rly all students attended religiously 
affiliated schools and that there were few options 
available for parents who did not want to send 
their child to a religiously affiliated school. Instead, 
the Court emphasized that the program was 
facially "neutral in all respects toward religion" 
(p. 653) and that the number of students attending 
religiously affiliated schools varies from year to 
year. The dissenters, in contrast, stressed these 
enrollment patterns. Noting that two-thirds of the 
parents participating in the program sen t their 
child ren to schools that "proselytized in a religion 
not their own" (p. 704), Justice David *Souter 
accused the majority of "ignoring the meaning of 
neutrality and private choice." 
NEAL DEVINS 
1115 
